ESSAY

OF DEATH AND DELUSION: WHAT SURVIVES KAHLER V.
KANSAS?

FREDRICK E. VARS†
Mental illness is not a crime. That fundamental proposition is threatened by the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kahler v. Kansas, which allows states to abolish
the insanity defense. This Essay presents three examples of absurd and discriminatory
results that could follow. But the conclusion is a positive one: constitutional
constraints not considered in Kahler—the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth
Amendment—should prevent the worst results from materializing.
INTRODUCTION
You are standing over the body of a man you just killed. You thought you
acted in self-defense, but the gun he was threatening you with was actually a
cellphone. In five states at least, you may be punished more harshly if the gun
was a hallucination produced by mental illness than if the mistake was a simple
misperception. The Supreme Court in Kahler v. Kansas recently approved that
result by holding that the traditional insanity defense is not mandated by the
Due Process Clause.1 Reports of the insanity defense’s “death,” however, are
† Ira Drayton Pruitt, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to Ian
Ayres, Heather Elliott, and Caroline Harada for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts. Jack
Kappelman and Charlotte Watters provided excellent research assistance.
1 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020). Five states have eliminated the traditional insanity
defense: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.010(a), 12.47.020 (2019)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18207(1), (3) (2020)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-5209 (2019)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §4614-102 (2019)), and Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West 2016)). More could follow. See
Stephen J. Morse & Richard J. Bonnie, Don’t Abolish the Insanity Defense, THE HILL (May 18, 2020,
9:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/497726-dont-abolish-the-insanity-defense [https://perma.cc/
SS9J-XPJX] (explaining that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kahler “gave a green light to every state
in the union to eﬀectively abolish the insanity defense”).
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greatly exaggerated.2 All but a handful of states have a meaningful insanity
defense, and most will likely keep the defense even though they are not
required to do so by due process. This Essay argues that the principles
underlying the insanity defense are so fundamental that other constitutional
provisions require government to retain much of the defense’s structure and
coverage. At a minimum, states must provide the mentally ill with the same
access to other criminal law defenses enjoyed by neurotypical individuals.3
This Essay proceeds in five parts. The first part summarizes the opinions in
Kahler, giving particular attention to a pair of hypotheticals posed by Justice
Breyer in dissent. The hypotheticals show that, in Kansas, criminal responsibility
can arbitrarily turn on the content of one’s delusion. Parts two and three offer
two more pairs of hypotheticals that are even more damning than the first. In
each case, individuals with mental illness are punished for their disease. The
final two parts argue that the irrationality and outright discrimination illustrated
by the three examples violate equal protection and the Eighth Amendment. The
Kahler Court let the traditional insanity defense die, but it cannot kill the
animating principle of punishment based on culpability.
I. THE KAHLER OPINIONS
James Kahler was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.4 At
trial, he was allowed to introduce evidence that his severe depression had
prevented him from forming the intent to kill (i.e., that he lacked mens rea),
and, at sentencing, he was allowed to oﬀer additional evidence of his mental
illness in mitigation.5 What he was not allowed to do under Kansas law,
however, was introduce evidence that, because of his mental illness, he was
unable to tell the diﬀerence between right and wrong. In other words, he was
prohibited from showing that he suﬀered from “moral incapacity” and was,
therefore, not guilty by reason of insanity.6

2 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Supreme Court Let States Kill the Insanity Defense, SLATE, (Mar.
24, 2020, 2:39 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/kahler-kansas-insanity-defensesupreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/5562-TVB8] (“[T]he Supreme Court dealt a death blow to the
insanity defense.”); see also Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson & Jordan S. Rubin, Insanity Defense Claims
Curbed by High Court in Murder Case (2), BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 23, 2020, 5:09 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/kansas-wins-u-s-supreme-court-dispute-over-insanitydefense [https://perma.cc/3XAK-67FU] (quoting Professor Carissa Byrne Hessick as stating that Kansas’s
current defense scheme is “not an insanity defense”).
3 Cf. Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal
Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000) (arguing that the insanity defense should be abolished as a separate
defense in favor of other defenses that do not depend on mental disability).
4 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 1026-27.
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The United States Supreme Court aﬃrmed Kahler’s conviction, holding
that Kansas did not violate the Due Process Clause by eliminating the moral
incapacity test for insanity.7 After surveying common-law authorities and
early case law,8 the Court concluded that the moral incapacity standard is not
a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.”9 The Court conceded that the insanity
defense is fundamental, but found that Kansas had not eliminated the defense
entirely because it allows mental health evidence to negate mens rea (i.e.,
cognitive incapacity) and to be considered in sentencing.10 Cognitive
incapacity and moral incapacity are alternative paths to insanity under the
traditional M’Naghten standard.11 In light of variations in earlier formulations
of the insanity defense (like the “wild beast” test),12 the Court held these
choices were permissible. The Court did not opine on the constitutionality of
eliminating both the cognitive incapacity and moral incapacity tests and
expressly declined to entertain Eighth Amendment arguments.13
Justice Breyer’s dissent oﬀered two hypotheticals to explain the stakes.14
In both hypothetical murder prosecutions, the accused person shot and killed
another person because of a delusion brought on by severe mental illness.15
In the ﬁrst case, the defendant thought the victim was a dog (a visual
hallucination), and thus did not know that he had killed a human being.16 This
is an example of cognitive incapacity. In the second case, the defendant
thought that a dog ordered him to kill the victim17 (an auditory hallucination);
he knew that his victim was human, but the killing occurred under the
pressure of the delusion. “Under the insanity defense as traditionally
understood, the government cannot convict either defendant. Under Kansas’
rule, it can convict the second but not the ﬁrst.”18 Kansas law, Justice Breyer
suggested at oral argument, makes no sense.19

7 Id. at 1027.
8 Id. at 1032-36.
9 Id. at 1027 (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)).
10 Id. at 1030-31.
11 M’Naghten’s Case (1843), 10 8 Eng. Rep. 718; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200.
12 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1032.
13 See id. at 1027 n.4 (noting that the Eighth Amendment claims were

not properly before the
Court because petitioner did not raise the argument in the state courts).
14 Id. at 1038 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-40, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-6135_5h26.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UHR-CE8Y].
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As the second hypothetical reveals, the dissent was not wed to the moral
incapacity test:20 one could feel compelled to follow a dog’s order even while
recognizing that doing so is wrong. Rather, the dissent in its own survey of
early sources found support for the more general proposition that there are
circumstances where mental illness negates culpability. What Kansas had
done wrong, Breyer asserted, was to jettison that fundamental principle in
too wide a swath of cases.21
II. IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE
Justice Breyer’s dog examples are just the tip of an irrationality iceberg.
Consider two additional hypothetical murder prosecutions. In each, the
accused person knowingly killed another person upon an unreasonable but
actual belief that deadly force was justiﬁed.22 In the ﬁrst case, the defendant
thought the victim held a gun rather than a cellphone because of poor
eyesight. In the second case, the defendant thought the victim held a gun
rather than a cellphone because the defendant was mentally ill and was
experiencing a visual hallucination.
In Kansas, the ﬁrst defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter only,23
whereas the second defendant is likely guilty of murder. This result ﬂows
from Kansas eliminating the moral incapacity test for insanity,24 in
combination with a case, State v. Ordway,25 that predates that abolition. In
that case, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the “‘unreasonable but honest
belief ’ necessary to support the ‘imperfect right to self-defense manslaughter’
cannot be based upon a psychotic delusion.”26 Thus, under Kansas law, the
second defendant—who perceived the cellphone as a gun because of a visual
hallucination—cannot invoke self-defense manslaughter, and, because Kansas
has abandoned the moral incapacity test, has no valid insanity defense to a
prosecution for second-degree murder. Yet the second defendant killed for
precisely the same reason as the ﬁrst defendant: because he thought the
victim’s cellphone was a gun.
20 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1039 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I do not mean to suggest that M’Naghten’s
particular approach to insanity is constitutionally required.”). Again, M’Naghten includes both cognitive
and moral incapacity paths to insanity. It was the moral incapacity prong that Kansas removed.
21 Id. at 1048.
22 This is the standard set forth in the Kansas voluntary manslaughter statute. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5404(a)(2) (2019).
23 See id. (deﬁning voluntary manslaughter as knowingly killing a human being “upon an
unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances exited that justiﬁed use of deadly force”).
24 Acting based on a delusion that self-defense is justiﬁed is a classic example of moral
incapacity. M’Naghten’s Case (1843), 10 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 723; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 211.
25 State v. Ordway, 934 P.2d 94 (Kan. 1997).
26 Id. at 104.
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Ordway contains little reasoning, but other cases provide some: to allow
voluntary manslaughter claims based on delusions “would open the ﬂood
gates to imperfect self-defense claims based entirely on a subjective state of
mind when the objective component is not present.”27 This “ﬂood gates”
argument is unpersuasive. The circumstances justifying deadly force are
narrowly deﬁned. For example, a self-defense claim in a homicide case can
prevail only where, if the misperception were real, the defendant could
“reasonably believe[] that such use of deadly force [was] necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or a third person.”28
Moreover, the traditional mens rea (cognitive incapacity) inquiry already
turns on the defendant’s subjective state of mind. If the law can accommodate
evidence that the defendant believed the victim was a dog, why shouldn’t
evidence of other delusions be permissible?
While Kansas’s slippery slope argument is unconvincing, the aﬃrmative
case for allowing imperfect self-defense claims based on delusions is
compelling. A defendant’s mental state is the same however a misperception
arises. In particular, “[a]ny genuine belief in the need for self-defense
precludes a murder conviction, because such a belief ‘cannot coexist’ with the
mental state of malice, an essential component of the crime of murder.”29
Thus, imperfect self-defense can arise from a delusion caused by mental
illness. At the time it was decided, Ordway’s pernicious impact was limited by
the availability of the moral incapacity test for insanity, but now its illogic is
unconstrained.30 Other cases that followed the Ordway rule cited the
existence of the moral incapacity test as a reason for doing so.31

27 Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 648 A.2d 563, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); see also State v.
Seifert, 454 N.W.2d 346, 352 (Wis. 1990) (“The doctrine of imperfect self-defense manslaughter
was simply never intended to cover situations such as this one where it is entirely the defendant’s
mental disease or defect, not an error in judgment or perception or a negligently-formed perspective
of the situation, that motivates the defendant’s actions.”).
28 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5222(b) (2019); see also State v. Roeder, 336 P.3d 831, 848 (Kan. 2014)
(explaining that in the case of voluntary manslaughter, “the circumstances which the defendant
honestly believed to exist must have been such as would have supported a claim of perfect selfdefense or defense-of-others, if true”).
29 People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d 951, 969 (Cal. 2014) (Kennard, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted); see also Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tenn. 1930)
(“How then can malice be imputed to a defendant when his reason is not merely obscured, but has
been swept away and kept away by an insane delusion under which he acts? How can such a
defendant be guilty of murder while his delusion persists?”).
30 The act of eliminating the moral incapacity test did not eliminate imperfect self-defense
because voluntary manslaughter on this ground is a lesser included oﬀense, not a defense. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (2019) (“It shall be a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the
defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state required as an
element of the crime charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense.”).
31 See, e.g., Elmore, 325 P.3d at 961 n.9.
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III. INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
You would not realize it reading the Kahler opinions, but Kansas has not
actually eliminated the moral incapacity test in toto. The test, oddly, still
applies to involuntary intoxication.32 Consider again two hypothetical murder
prosecutions. In each, the accused person intentionally killed another person
because they were unable to resist a command from God. The ﬁrst defendant
was mentally ill and the second defendant had unknowingly ingested a
hallucinogenic drug. Kansas would hold the mentally ill defendant guilty of
murder, but acquit the drugged defendant if his intoxicated condition
“rendered [him] substantially incapable of knowing or understanding the
wrongfulness of [his] conduct and of conforming [his] conduct to the
requirements of law.”33
Both defendants are equally blameless.34 The source of their delusion, like
the source of a mistaken belief that a cellphone was a gun, has no bearing on
their culpability. One rationale case law provides for this disparate treatment
echoes the subjective-objective distinction above: “A person seeking a
determination of insanity presents evidence that is primarily subjective, while
a person seeking to establish a defense of an intoxicated or drugged condition
may present evidence that includes objective or scientiﬁc methods, such as a
blood test.”35 This distinction is exaggerated. Objective evidence like blood
tests will often not be available; moreover, two people can respond very
diﬀerently to the same dose of a drug. Assessing intoxication retrospectively
“can generate at least as much uncertainty as imprecision or controversy in
mental illness categories.”36 “I was drugged” can be harder to evaluate than “I
have schizophrenia.”
But even if the distinction is suﬃcient to justify channeling mental health
evidence into the insanity defense, it cannot support the disparate treatment
of two equally blameless defendants once the insanity defense is unavailable.
Indeed, the case above that drew the subjective-objective evidence distinction
relied expressly on the availability of the traditional insanity defense,
including moral incapacity, to reject an equal protection challenge.37

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5205 (2019).
Id. § 21-5205(a).
See generally Fredrick E. Vars, When God Spikes Your Drink: Guilty Without Mens Rea, 4 CAL. L.
REV. CIR. 209 (2013) (describing parallel illogic produced by barring mental health evidence on mens rea).
35 People v. Teran, 818 N.E.2d 1278, 1290 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
36 Vars, supra note 34, at 213.
37 Teran, 818 N.E.2d at 1290.
32
33
34
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IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
The three pairs of hypotheticals presented above show that Kansas law is
now riddled with irrational classiﬁcations. Starting with Justice Breyer’s
example, it is arbitrary to premise criminal responsibility on the content of a
delusion—seeing a dog versus hearing a dog. The Supreme Court of Utah
nonetheless rejected an equal protection challenge to this distinction, 38
reasoning that, in Justice Breyer’s terms, the person who hears a dog but
knows they are killing a person is arguably more culpable than the person who
thinks they are killing a dog. This distinction may persuade some courts.
The Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning, however, does not apply to the selfdefense and intoxication hypotheticals, where the discrimination is based
squarely on the fact of mental illness, not the content of a delusion. In both
cases, a person with the identical state of mind as a person without mental
illness is relieved of criminal responsibility, whereas the mentally ill person
is punished for their illness. This disparate treatment of similarly situated
defendants is so irrational as to violate equal protection.39
The equal protection discussion could end here if the Supreme Court had
not actually approved this type of irrational punishment scheme. In Clark v.
Arizona, the Court upheld Arizona’s prohibition on presenting mental health
evidence on the issue of intent.40 Arizona’s scheme is Kansas ﬂipped: seeing
a dog is no defense, but hearing a dog is. That is because Arizona, along with
eight other states, prohibits mental health evidence on mens rea, but allows
it to prove an insanity defense.41 Clark relied on perceived diﬀerences
between mental health evidence and other types of evidence reminiscent of
the subjective-objective distinction above. As the dissent correctly observed,
however, “[t]here is no rational basis . . . for criminally punishing a person
who commits a killing without knowledge or intent only if that person has a
mental illness.”42 Sadly, a majority on the high court appears unconcerned
about discrimination against people with mental illness in the general
criminal law.

State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368-69 (Utah 1995).
Id. at 384-85 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll,
and the Due Process of Proof, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 213 (1996) (“The Equal Protection Clause limits
the state’s ability to deﬁne crimes even within the domain unconstrained by the Due Process Clause,
and it precludes making arbitrary distinctions among those who kill.”).
40 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 742 (2006).
41 Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-502(A) (2009)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11
§401(a) (2012)), Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-2(a) (2012)), Indiana (IND. CODE §35-41-3-6(a)
(2017)), Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §14:14 (2019)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2901.01(A)(14)
(West 2019)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §17-24-10(A) (1989)), South Dakota (S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §22-1-2(20) (2020)), and Texas (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §8.01(a) (West 1994)).
42 Clark, 548 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
38
39
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V. EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Clark, therefore, appears to have foreclosed the equal protection
argument, but the Eighth Amendment provides a backstop. As in Clark,
Courts accord a particularly high level of deference to legislatures in deﬁning
crimes.43 Two exceptions relevant here are status oﬀenses and the death
penalty.44 Punishment based on status rather than conduct violates the Eighth
Amendment. “Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”45 Mental illness, like
having a cold, cannot be a lawful basis for punishment.46 That proposition is
violated in each of the three pairs of hypotheticals. One cannot control the
content of one’s delusions, nor having them in the ﬁrst place.
No criminal sanction should rest on these distinctions, but certainly not
the ultimate sanction. Due process, equal protection, and the Eighth
Amendment all prohibit “arbitrary” distinctions,47 but the word has a special
meaning in Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence. To defend
against a due process or equal protection claim of arbitrariness, the court need
only hypothesize a legitimate rationale of any type: “mental health evidence
is confusing” can apparently suﬃce. To defend against an Eighth Amendment
claim of arbitrariness in a death penalty case, on the other hand, there must
be a very particular type of reason for more severe punishment: greater
culpability. The imposition of a penalty of death must be “directly related to
the personal culpability of the criminal defendant,” and “reﬂect a reasoned
moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime.”48
Perhaps the best example of this is Enmund v. Florida, in which the Supreme
Court held that an accomplice to robbery who neither killed nor intended to

43 State v. Danis, 826 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr. &
GianCarlo Canaparo, Are Criminals Bad or Mad? Premeditated Murder, Mental Illness, and Kahler v.
Kansas, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 153 (2020) (“[T]he Constitution leaves entirely to the
political process the deﬁnition of the penal code because the judgments involved in drafting it
involve precisely the type of moral decisions that the public and its elected representatives are fully
competent to make.”).
44 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60-61 (2010) (cataloguing some of the Court’s
categorical rules limiting imposition of the death penalty).
45 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
46 See State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 385 (Utah 1995) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The statutory
discrimination between sane persons and insane persons is . . . irrational.”); Elizabeth Bennion,
Death Is Diﬀerent No Longer: Abolishing the Insanity Defense Is Cruel and Unusual Under Graham v.
Florida, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2011) (“[T]he absolute abolishment of insanity as an independent
defense is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual . . . .”).
47 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (due process); City of Cleburne. v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (equal protection); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381
(1999) (Eighth Amendment).
48 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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kill could not receive the death penalty.49 The Court surveyed state law and
practice, but ultimately reached its own judgment. Because the defendant’s
culpability was “plainly different from that of the robbers who killed,” treating
them alike “was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.”50
To be clear, disparate results in similar cases is not itself unconstitutional.51
What is not permissible is a classification that allows the death penalty for
some individuals while arbitrarily excluding individuals who are equally (or
more) culpable. Capital punishment must be limited to the most culpable
offenders.52 “It is in regard to the eligibility phase that [the Court has] stressed
the need for channeling and limiting the jury’s discretion to ensure that the
death penalty is a proportionate punishment and therefore not arbitrary or
capricious in its imposition.”53 Making defendants death-eligible because of
their mental illness is arbitrariness that cannot be cured by allowing mental
health evidence to support discretionary mitigation at sentencing.54
CONCLUSION
In rejecting a due process challenge to Kansas’ elimination of the moral
incapacity test for insanity, the Kahler majority left in place a thoroughly
irrational and arbitrary criminal justice system. People with one kind of dog
delusion are punished whereas people with another dog delusion are not.
People who feel threatened as the result of a delusion are punished as murderers
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
Id. at 798.
A petitioner “cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other defendants
who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
306-07 (1987) (emphasis omitted); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984) (“There is . . .
no basis in our cases for holding that comparative proportionality review by an appellate court is
required in every case in which the death penalty is imposed and the defendant requests it.”).
52 See generally Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental
Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785 (2009) (discussing the relationship between capital
punishment and culpability, and its relevance to death penalty jurisprudence as it pertains to mental illness).
53 Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1998); see also Scott W. Howe, Race, Death and
Disproportionality, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 213, 239 (2010) (“[A]n exemption from the death penalty based
on disproportionality should apply for oﬀenders who were insane at the time of their crimes under
nationally prevailing deﬁnitions of insanity.”). Cf. Eric Roytman, Kahler v. Kansas: The End of the
Insanity Defense?, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 43, 43-58 (Feb. 14, 2020)
(overlooking the Court’s categorical death penalty rules in arguing that Kahler could bring only an
as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge).
54 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Supreme Court Let States Kill the Insanity Defense, SLATE (Mar.
24, 2020, 2:39 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/kahler-kansas-insanity-defensesupreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/J3UA-Z7M6] (explaining the diﬀerence between a defense
and a mitigating factor). Here’s what a constitutional sentencing statute might look like: “the death
penalty for aggravated murder is precluded when . . . . The oﬀense was primarily the product of the
oﬀender’s psychosis or mental deﬁciency . . . .” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 612 (1978) (quoting a
since-replaced Ohio statute).
49
50
51

2020]

Of Death and Delusion

99

whereas people who feel threatened as the result of bad eyesight are not. People
whose delusions stem from mental illness are punished whereas people with
the same delusions produced by intoxicating substances are not.
These distinctions violate equal protection and the Eighth Amendment
and should be stricken across the board. But even if courts creatively imagine
“rational” bases for these distinctions, none of the distinctions (especially the
second and third examples) have anything to do with culpability. Mental
illness must not carry any criminal penalty, and emphatically not a death
sentence. Making people death-eligible because their false beliefs arise from
mental illness rather than poor eyesight or intoxication is wholly arbitrary
and therefore constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Court’s
death penalty jurisprudence.55
The insanity defense cannot be excised from the body of criminal law
without tearing holes in its heart, the notion of punishment based on
culpability. Due process may permit this butchery after Kahler, but equal
protection and the Eighth Amendment stitch together many of the holes. The
insanity defense is dead; long live the insanity defense.

55 Taking the death penalty oﬀ the table, while leaving lesser sanctions untouched, would still
be a very big deal in the insanity context. The insanity defense is most often raised in serious cases.
In a leading study, nearly two-thirds of insanity acquittals involved murder, physical assault, or
another crime of violence. Lisa A. Callahan, Henry J. Steadman, Margaret A. McGreevy & Pamela
Clark Robbins, The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 331, 336 tbl.2 (1991). By comparison, in 1991 (the year the insanity
defense study was published), the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that nineteen percent of all
crimes in the twenty-ﬁve largest cities were violent. Selected Crime, Criminal Justice, and Demographic
Data - 25 Largest Cities, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Oﬃce of Justice Programs (Nov. 18, 1999),
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2059 [https://perma.cc/H6TE-LFDQ].

